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Abstract
Exploiting recent advances in monitoring technology and the drop of its costs, authoritarian and oppressive
regimes are tightening the grip around the virtual lives of their citizens. Meanwhile, the dissidents, oppressed
bytheseregimes,areorganizingonline,cloakingtheiractivitywithanti-censorshipsystemsthattypically
consist of a network of anonymizing proxies. The censors have become well aware of this, and they are
systematically ﬁnding and blocking all the entry points to these networks. So far, they have been quite
successful. We believe that, to achieve resilience to blocking, anti-censorship systems must abandon the
idea of having alimited number of entry points. Instead, they should establish ﬁrstcontact in an online location
arbitrarily chosen by each of their users. To explore this idea, we have developed Message In A Bottle, a
protocol where any blog post becomes a potential “drop point” for hidden messages. We have developed
andreleasedaproof-of-conceptapplicationusingoursystem,anddemonstrateditsfeasibility. Toblockthis
system, censors are left with a needle-in-a-haystack problem: Unable to identify what bears hidden messages,
they must block everything, effectively disconnecting their own network from a large part of the Internet. This,
hopefully, is a cost too high to bear.
1 Introduction
The revolutionary wave of protests and demonstrations known as the Arab Spring rose in December 2010 to
shake the foundations of a number of countries (e.g., Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt), and showed the Internet’s
immensepowertocatalyzesocialawarenessthroughthefreeexchangeofideas. Thispowerissothreateningto
repressive regimes that censorship has become a central point in their agendas: Regimes have been investing in
advanced censoring technologies [37], and even resorted to a complete isolation from the global network in critical
moments [10]. For example, Pakistan recently blocked Wikipedia, YouTube, Flickr, and Facebook [23], and
Syria blocked citizen-journalism media sites [44].
To sneak by the censorship, the dissident populations have resorted to technology. A report from Harvard’s
CenterforInternet&Society[38]showsthatthemostpopularcensorship-avoidancevectorsarewebproxies,
VPNs, and Tor [13]. These systems share a common characteristic: They have a limited amount of entry points.
Blocking these entry points, and evading the blocking effort, has become an arms race: China is enumerating
and banning the vast majority of Tor’s bridges since 2009 [50], while in 2012, Iran took a more radical approach
and started blocking encrypted trafﬁc [47], which Tor countered the same day by deploying a new kind of trafﬁc
camouﬂaging [46].
In this paper, we take a step back and explore whether it is possible to design a system that is so pervasive that
it is impossible to block without disconnecting from the global network.
Let’s generalize the problem at hand with the help of Alice, a dissident who lives on the oppressed country
of Tyria and wants to communicate with Bob, who lives outside the country. To establish a communication
channel with Bob in any censorship-resistant protocol, Alice must know something about Bob. In the case of
anonymizing proxies or mix-networks (e.g., Tor), this datum is the address of one of the entry points into the
network. Inprotocolsthatemploysteganographytohidemessagesinﬁlesuploadedtomedia-hostingsites(suchas
Collage [8]) or in network trafﬁc (such as Telex [54]), Alice must know the location of the ﬁrst rendezvous point.
The fact that Alice has to know something about Bob inevitably means that the censor can learn that too
(as he might be Alice). Bob cannot avoid this without having some information to distinguish Alice from the
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something that Alice has to know is a fundamental weakness of existing censorship-resistant protocols, which
forms a crack in their resilience to blocking. For example, this is the root cause of the issues that Tor is facing with
distributing bridge addresses to its users without exposing them to the censor [45]. It is because of this crack
that China has been blocking the majority of Tor trafﬁc since 2009 [50]: the number of entry points is ﬁnite, and a
determined attacker can enumerate them by claiming to be Alice.
In Message In A Bottle (MIAB), we have designed a protocol where Alice knows the least possible about
Bob. In fact, we will show that Alice must know Bob’s public key, and nothing else. Alice must know at least
Bob’s public key to authenticate him and be sure she is not talking to a disguised censor. However, contrary to
systems like Collage and Telex, there isno rendezvous point between Alice and Bob.
This may now sound like a needle-in-a-haystack problem: If neither Alice nor Bob know how to contact the
other one, how can they ever meet on the Internet? In order to make this possible and reasonably fast, MIAB
exploits one of the mechanisms that search engines employ to generate real-time results from blog posts and
news articles: blog pings. Through these pings, Bob is covertly notiﬁed that a new message from Alice is available,
and where to fetch it from. We will show that, just like a search engine, Bob can monitor the majority of the blogs
published on the entire Internet with limited resources, and in quasi real-time. In some sense, every blog becomes
a possible meeting point for Alice and Bob. However, there are over 165 million blogs online [5], and since
a blog can be opened trivially by anybody, for our practical purposes they constitute an inﬁnite resource. We
have estimated that, to blacklist all the possible MIAB’s drop points, the Censor should block 40 million fully
qualiﬁeddomainnames,andfourmillionIPaddresses(aswewillshowinSection5.3,theseareconservative
estimates). For comparison, blacklisting a single IP address would block Collage’s support for Flickr (the only one
implemented), and supporting additional media-hosting sites requires manual intervention for each one.
In MIAB, Alice will prepare a message for Bob and encrypt it with his public key. This ciphertext will be
steganographically embedded in some digital photos. Then, Alice will prepare a blog post about a topic that ﬁts
those photos, and publish it, along with the photos, on a blog of her choosing. Meanwhile, Bob is monitoring
the stream of posts as they get published. He will recognize Alice’s post (effectively, the bottle that contains the
proverbial message), and recover the message.
We envision that MIABmight be used to bootstrap more efﬁcient anonymity protocols that require Alice and
Bob to know each other a little better (such as Collage, or Telex).
Our main contributions are:
• A new primitive for censorship-resistant protocols that requires Alice to have minimal knowledge about Bob;
• A study of the feasibility of this approach;
• An open-source implementation of a proof-of-concept application of MIABthat lets user tweet anonymously
and deniably on Twitter.
2 Threat model
The adversary we are facing, the Censor, is a country-wide authority that monitors and interacts with online
communications. His intent is to discover and suppress the spreading of dissident ideas.
Determining the current and potential capabilities of modern censors of this kind (e.g., Iran and China) is
adifﬁculttask,astheinnerworkingsofthecensoringinfrastructureareoftenkeptsecret. However,wecancreatea
reasonable model for our adversary by observing that, ultimately, the Censor will be constrained by economic
factors. Therefore, we postulate that the censorship we are facing is inﬂuenced by these two factors:
• The censoring infrastructure will be constrained by its cost and technological effort
• Over-censoring will have a negative impact on the economy of the country
From these factors, we can now devise the capabilities of our Censor. We choose to do so in a conservative
fashion, preferring to overstate the Censor’s powers than to understate them. We make this choice also because we
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advances and becomes more pervasive.
We assume that it is in the Censor’s interest to let the general population beneﬁt from Internet access,
because of the social and economic advantages of connectivity. This is a fundamental assumption for any
censorship-avoidance system: If the country runs an entirely separate network, there is no way out1.
Because the Censor bears some cost from over-blocking, he will favor blacklisting over whitelisting, banning
trafﬁc only when it deems it suspicious. When possible, the Censor will prefer trafﬁc disruption over modiﬁcation,
as the cost of deep-packet inspection and modiﬁcation is higher than just blocking the stream. For example, if the
Censor suspects that the dissidents are communicating through messages hidden in videos on YouTube, he is
more likely to block access to the site rather than re–encoding every downloaded video, as this would impose
a high toll on his computational capabilities. Also, we assume that if the Censor chooses to alter uncensored trafﬁc,
he will do so in a manner that the user would not easily notice.
The Censor might also issue falseTLS certiﬁcates with a CertiﬁcateAuthority under its control. With them, he
might man-in-the-middle connections with at least one endpoint within his country.
As part of his infrastructure, the Censor might deploy multiple monitoring stations anywhere within his
jurisdiction. Through these stations, he can capture, analyze, modify, disrupt, and store indeﬁnitely network trafﬁc.
In the rest of the world, he will only be able to harness what is commercially
The Censor can analyze trafﬁc aggregates to discover outliers in trafﬁc patterns, and proﬁle encrypted trafﬁc
with statistical attacks on the packets content or timing. Also, he might drill down to observe the trafﬁc of
individual users.
The Censor will have knowledge of any publicly available censorship-avoidance technology, including MIAB.
In particular, he might join the system as a user, or run a MIABinstance to lure dissidents into communicating with
him. Also, he might inject additional trafﬁc into an existing MIABinstance to try to confuse or overwhelm it.
3 Design
In its essence, MIABis a system devised to allow Alice, who lives in a country ruled by an oppressive regime,
to communicate conﬁdentially with Bob, who resides outside the country. Alice does not need to know any
information about Bob except his public key.
In particular, MIABshould satisfy these properties:
• Conﬁdentiality: The Censor should not be able to read the messages sent by Alice.
• Availability: The Censor should not be able to block MIABwithout incurring unacceptable costs (by indiscrim-
inately blocking large portions of the Internet).
• Deniability: Whenconﬁdentialityholds,theCensorshouldnotbeabletodistinguishwhetherAliceisusing
the system, or behaving normally.
• Non-intrusive deployment: Deploying and operating a MIABinstance should be easy and cheap.
To achieve these properties, the MIABprotocol imposes substantial overhead. We do not strive for MIAB’s
performance to be acceptable for low latency (interactive) communication over the network (such as web surﬁng).
Instead, we want our users to communicate past the Censor by sending small messages (e.g., emails, articles,
tweets). Also, MIAB can be employed to exchange the necessary information to bootstrap other anonymity
protocols that require some pre-shared secret, as we will discuss in Section 4.
The only requirement that Alice must satisfy to use this protocol is to be able to make a blog post. She can
create this post on any blog hosted (or self-hosted) outside the Censor’s jurisdiction.
3.1 Components
Before explaining the details of the MIABprotocol, we must introduce two concepts that will play a crucial role in
our system. The ﬁrst is the notion of a blog ping. The second is the metadata that is associated with digital photos.
1We are strictly speaking about traditional ways to leak messages to the Internet through network communication.
213.1.1 Blog pings.
A blog ping is a message sent from a blog to a centralized network service (a ping server) to notify the server of
neworupdatedcontent. BlogpingswereintroducedinOctober2001byDaveWiner,theauthorofthepopular
ping server weblogs.com, and are now a well-established reality. Over the last ten years, the rising popularity
ofpingspushedforthedevelopmentofawealthofprotocolsthatcompeteforperformanceandscalability(e.g.,
FriendFeed’s SUP [26], Google’s PubSubHubbub [27], and rssCloud [43]).
Search engines use blog pings to efﬁciently index new content in real time. Since search engines drive a
good part of the trafﬁc on the Internet, blog writers adopt pings to increase their exposure and for Search Engine
Optimization. Consequently, the vast majority of blogging platforms support pings, and have them enabled by
default (e.g., Wordpress, Blogger, Tumblr, Drupal).
3.1.2 Digital photo metadata.
Digital cameras store metadata embedded within each photo. This metadata keeps records of a variety of
information, including the condition of the shot, GPS coordinates, user comments, copyright, post-processing, and
thumbnails. Three metadata-encoding formats dominate in popularity, and are supported by the vast majority of
cameras and photo editing software: IIM [31], XMP [55], and EXIF [16].
IIM (Information Interchange Model) is an older standard developed in the nineties by the International Press
Telecommunications Council. It was initially conceived as a standard for exchanging text, photos and videos
between news agencies. In 1995, Adobe’s Photoshop adopted IPTC-IIM to store metadata in digital photos, and it
is now ubiquitous in the digital camera world.
The second format, XMP (Extensible Metadata Platform) was developed by Adobe in 2001. XMP is
XML/RDF-based, and its standard is public and open-source.
ThelastformatisEXIF(ExchangeableImageFileFormat). ItwasdevelopedbytheJapaneseElectronics
Industry Development Association (JEIDA) in 1998, and evolved over the years. It is based upon the TIFF format.
A particular EXIF tag,MakerNote, stores manufacturer-speciﬁc binary content.
Toobservethepopularityofeachoftheseformats,wedownloaded15,000photosfromFlickr. Toreacha
broadnumberofphotographers,weselectedthephotosusingFlickrpopulartags[20]. Thedistributionofthe
metadata formats in our dataset is shown in Table 1. EXIF is by far the most popular format, as it was present in
96.63% of the photos with metadata (note that a photo might contain more than one format). We also observed that
the MakerNotetag usually accounts for the majority of metadata space.
3.2 The MIABProtocol
Our scene opens with Alice, who lives in a country controlled by the Censor. Alice wants to communicate with
Bob, who is residing outside the country, without the Censor ever knowing that this communication took place. To
do so, Alice sends a message with the MIABprotocol following these steps:
1. Alice authors a blog post of arbitrary content. The content should be selected to be as innocuous as possible.
2. Alice snaps one or more photos to include in the post.
3. Alice uses the MIABclient software to embed a message M into the photos. The message is hidden using
shared-key steganography [42]. We will identify the shared key asKs. Alice chooses the shared key arbitrarily.
4. Ks is encrypted with the public key of Bob KP. This cipher-text is hidden in the photos’ metadata, using
tags thatappear inconspicuousto the Censor(e.g.,Exif.Photo.ImageUniqueID, whichcontains an
arbitrary identiﬁer assigned uniquely to each image). To better understand the location of the various data
embedded in photos, please refer to Figure 1.
5. Alice publishes the blog post, containing the processed photos. Alice can choose the blog arbitrarily, provided
it supports blog pings. We will discuss this in more detail in Section 5.2.
6. The blog emits a ping to some ping servers.
7. Meanwhile, Bob is monitoring some of the ping servers, looking for steganographic content encrypted with his
public key. Within minutes, he discovers Alice’s post, and decrypts the message.
22Figure 1: Alice’s mes-
sage
Number of photos % of dataset %ofphotoswithmeta-
data
No metadata 2093 13,95%
EXIF present 12,472 83.15% 96.63%
XMP present 2972 19.81% 23.03%
IPTC-IIM present 666 4.44% 5.16%
Table 1: Metadata formats in photos on Flickr
8. Bob reads the message, and acts upon its content (more on this later).
Looking at Figure 1, the reader might wonder why we did not choose to store the messageM, encrypted with
KP, directly into the metadata. The reason is that available space is limited (e.g., in our implementation, we found
about13.5bytesofspace). Instead,theimagedataisoftheorderofmegabytesinsize, andwecanembedinita
message of a few kilobytes (this size depends on the size of the image, and the steganographic scheme used).
Also, notice that Steps 3 and 4 are essentially a simple public-key image steganography (PKIS) [51] scheme:
Amessageishiddeninanimageusingapublickey,andcanonlyberetrievedwiththecorrespondingprivatekey.
NotethatanyPKISschemecouldbeusedinplaceofSteps3and4, andmightimprovethedeniabilityof MIAB(for
example,becauseitwouldnotbenecessarytoaltertheimages’metadata). Inourproof-of-conceptimplementation
of MIAB, we have chosen the presented scheme because we can use shared-key image-steganography tools, which
arewidelyavailable (e.g., Outguess[40], StegHide[29]). Wearenot awareofanyopen-source implementation
ofanyotherPKISscheme. MIAB’sdeniabilityisadirectconsequenceofthePKISschemeused,butourmain
contribution is, then, to create an highly-available protocol that is difﬁcult and expensive for the Censor to block.
To be able to use MIAB, Alice needs a copy of the software, which will also contain Bob’s public key. This
bundle can be downloaded before the Censor becomes too controlling, or can be published around the web in
different formats, so that the Censor cannot easily ﬁngerprint and block it. Optionally, it can be distributed through
spam, or ofﬂine via USB drives. We expect that the Censor will also have a copy of the software.
4 Applications
The MIABprotocol can be a useful component for a variety of applications. We will outline the ones we believe are
most interesting, one of which we implemented.
4.1 Covert messaging
In this setting, Alice wants to send a message (e.g., email or tweet) out of the country in a deniable fashion. She
does so simply by using the MIABprotocol to publish her message embedded in a blog post, leaving instructions
to Bob on how to handle it. To showcase this application, we have implemented a Twitter proxy that relays
the messages found through MIABto Twitter, publishing them under the @corked_bottle handle. MIAB
could also be used to communicate with a censorship-resistant microblogging service, like #h00t [2], or a
privacy-preserving one, like Hummingbird [12].
To achieve two-way messaging, Alice composes a comment to the blog post she is about to publish. She
sends this comment to Bob with MIAB, appended to her message. When Bob wants to reply to Alice’s message,
he steganographically encodes his answer inside the comment, and posts the comment on Alice’s blog (or any blog
Alice has chosen for posting her messages). Alice will either be notiﬁed of Bob’s action by email or RSS feed,
or she will check her blog every now and then. Alice’s behavior should not be considered suspicious by the Censor,
since blog writers have a habit of checking comments on their posts frequently.
To appear even more inconspicuous to the Censor, Alice might arbitrarily pick any other blog available on the
Internet, and tell Bob to post the comment containing the reply there. A good meeting point for this is one of the
blogs and online newspapers (provided they allow comments) that Alice reads on a regular basis.
23How Bob hides his reply will depend on Alice’s directives. An option is that Alice includes an image (or
provides a private link to one) in her comment, and Bob embeds the message into this image. Since Alice and
Bob have already established a shared secret, there is no need for metadata. Another option is that Bob encodes his
replyinthecomment’stext. NotethatourschemeauthenticatesonlyBob,asnotbeingidentiﬁedisinAlice’s
interest. However, after the ﬁrst message is sent, Bob and Alice share a session key, so that the Censor cannot
pretend to be Alice and take over her role in the current message exchange.
Thismethodofcovertmessagingsuffersanoticeableoverheadwithrespecttostandardmessaging. Toachieve
better efﬁciency, we envision that MIABcould be used to bootstrap some faster, shared-key protocol.
4.2 Bootstrapping Collage
Collage [8] is a protocol that uses user-generated content (e.g., photos, tweets) as drop sites for hidden messages.
Differentlyfromthe MIABapproach,inCollage,thedropsitesmustbedecideduponinadvance: Theserendezvous
points are the secret that Alice and Bob share. To put and retrieve the messages from these rendezvous points,
the users of Collage have to perform a series of tasks. For example, if the drop site is a photo posted on Flickr [19]
under the keyword “ﬂowers,” the sender task will be the series of HTTP requests required to post a photo with that
keyword,andthereceivertask willbecomposedofrequestsdesignedtoretrievethelatestphotoswiththattag.
To bootstrap a Collage installation, the database of tasks that Collage employs must be distributed ofﬂine.
This database needs to be constantly updated as the Censor reacts and the drop sites change (both in location
and structure). It is, therefore, crucial that this bootstrap database is up-to-date: Otherwise, the agreement on
the drop points between sender and receiver will be lost, breaking the communication channel.
Once Collage has been bootstrapped, further updates can be received through the Collage network. To receive
these updates, however, the Collage client must be connected to the Internet. When the connectivity is sporadic,
the client’s database might become obsolete, and a new bootstrap round will become necessary.
Webelievethat MIABisagoodﬁtforbootstrappingCollage,becausetheonlyinformationthatAlicemust
know about Bob in order to request a current copy of the task database is Bob’s public key. This key should rarely
change, so it can be shipped with the software. If the Censor is already too controlling to allow this, the key and the
software (which is just a few kilobytes in size) can be published online in a variety of formats, so that it will be
difﬁcult for the Censor to ﬁnd and block them all.
5 Implementation
To demonstrate the feasibility of MIAB, we have implemented a proof-of-concept application that can be used to
post anonymous messages on Twitter, circumventing the block on social networks imposed by Tyria’s Censor.
To provide a more open evaluation, we have published the code online: The application can be downloaded at
http://www.message-in-a-bottle.us, together with our public key.
We have set up a small cluster of machines that monitors one of the most popular blog ping servers
(webblogs.com2),lookingfor MIABmessages(ourclusterplaysBob’spartinthealgorithm). Whenamessage
is found, its content is posted on Twitter under the handle@corked_bottle.
Also, the code can be used with a new public/private key-pair to verify how messages are recovered.
5.0.1 Public-key cryptography
Our application can use either GnuPG or X.509 certiﬁcates. We ship a self-signed X.509 certiﬁcate, containing the
RSA public key.
5.0.2 Steganography
We use outguess [41] as the steganographic primitive. This tool works on Linux, *BSD, and Windows, so
it will most probably run on Alice’s computer. We are aware that an attack on outguess is known [25]. We
choose this particular software out of convenience: Any steganographic tool can be used, and the change required
2For example, blogs hosted on Google’sblogger.com ping this server, unless the blog owner disables this.
24in the code is trivial. See also Section 3.2 for a discussion on an alternative approach with public-key image
steganography.
5.0.3 Blog-fetching cluster
WeusefourserverswithIntelXeon2.40GHzprocessors,4GigabytesofRAM,andhigh-speedInternetconnection.
5.0.4 Photo metadata
WehidetheoutputofRSAKP(Ks)inEXIFandXMPmetadata,andintheﬁlename. Theciphertextisstoredin
base 10, 16, or 60, depending on the format stored in the tags. We employ two photos, hiding 13.5 bytes of key per
photo. The list of tags employed, and some sample content, is provided in Table 2. The Table also reports the
number of bits, calculated with Shannon’s entropy, that are undetectable. That is, the bits whose values have a high
entropy throughout our dataset, and for which it is difﬁcult to tell if they have been altered. In the example data in
the Table, the undetectable bits are highlighted in bold. Note that the sample content has been extracted from
a photo downloaded from Flickr [19]. In the case of tags holding aDateTime object, we hide the ciphertext only
in the minutes and seconds.
Toshowthatthisciphertextcouldbehiddeninavarietyoflocations,westoreapartofitinthedigitscontained
in the ﬁlename (e.g., DSC01234.JPG). All these decision are arbitrary, and every MIAB instance can make
different choices.
Metadata tag Example Format Description Undetectable bits
Exif.Photo.SubSecTimeOriginal 22 Ascii Centiseconds when the photo has
been taken (the date and time up to
the seconds precision are kept in the
DateTimeOriginal tag)
6.64
Exif.Photo.SubSecTimeDigitized 90 Ascii CentisecondsfortheDateTimeDigi-
talized tag
6.64
Exif.Photo.SubSecTime 75 Ascii Centiseconds for the DateTime tag 6.64
Exif.Photo.ImageUniqueID 713E4D7FC20E42C1
A1617CE642C28017
Ascii Arbitrary,uniqueidentiﬁerassigned
to the photo
16
Xmp.xmpMM.OriginalDocument 3856450D6BAB4CE5
AFD64DAF89C3C198
Ascii Arbitrary,uniqueidentiﬁerassigned
original document, when editing a
photo
16
Xmp.aux.ImageNumber 49,202 Ascii Photoshop’s auxiliary image num-
ber
16
Exif.Image.ImageNumber 233 Long Unique number assigned to a photo 16
Exif.Image.DateTime 2011-09-25 15:52:04 Ascii The date and time of image creation
(we only alter the minutes and sec-
onds).
11.81
Exif.Photo.DateTimeOriginal 2011-08-23 11:27:27 Ascii The date and time when the original
image data was generated (we only
alter the minutes and seconds)
11.81
Table 2: EXIF and XMP tags: example photo taken from Flickr
5.1 Evaluation
MIABrelies on Bob’s ability to fetch and process all the blog posts created on the Internet in real time. To prove
that this is feasible, we have done so with our cluster.
Over the period of three months (72 days), we have seen 814,667,299 blog posts, as shown in Figure 2. The
average number of posts seen per day is 11,314,823, and the highest trafﬁc we have experienced is 13,083,878
posts in a day. Being a proof-of-concept, our implementation delivers suboptimal performance in terms of blog
throughput (it is written in Python). So, we had to use four machines to keep up with the post rate. To estimate
the performance limits of a single machine fetching and analyzing web pages, we tested Apache Nutch [22], a
high-performancewebcrawlerwritteninJavaandbuiltuponApacheHadoop[21]. Inourexperiment,wewere
able to fetch more than 15 million pages per day. Since we have observed that our MIABcluster is limited by its
25Figure 2: Blogs pings received over a period of three
months
  



























Figure3: Blogpingreceivedduringdayone(5minutes
slices)
  

























 

Figure 4: Number of photos per blog during day one Figure 5: Blacklist size, when targeting fully qualiﬁed
domain names
capacity of fetching and parsing the blog posts, and not by the image processing, we expect that an optimized
implementation of MIABshould be able to achieve a similar performance.
Thepingserverwechosereleaseseveryﬁveminutesthepingsthatitreceivedduringthatperiod. Tokeepup
with the ping rate, we process all the blog posts of one chunk of pings before the next one is released. Therefore,
the maximum latency between the publishing of a post with MIABcontent and our tweeting is ten minutes (ﬁve
minutes in the ping server’s queue, and another ﬁve before we process the post), with an average of ﬁve minutes.
During the course of a day, we have found that the rate of blog posts is quite stable, with an average of 44,146
posts every ﬁve minutes, and a low standard deviation of3,963. See Figure 3 for an example.
We observed that approximately half of the blog posts contain photos. The distribution of the number of
photos per post is shown in Figure 4.
5.2 Choosing the Right Blog
To send a message through MIAB, Alice has to publish a post on a blog that supports pings. Alice might already
have posting privileges on such a blog: In this case, she can just use it. Otherwise, Alice needs to open one, or be
addedasanauthortoanexistingone. ItisthereforeinterestingtoseehowdifﬁcultitisforAlicetoopenablog
supporting pings.
26Figure 6: Blacklist size, when targeting second-level
domains
Figure 7: Blacklist size, when targeting IP addresses.
Platform Number of sites (%) Ping support
WordPress 63.49 yes
Joomla! 11.17 yes
Drupal 8.57 yes
Blogger 3.14 yes
Table 3: Blogging platform popularity: Alexa’s
top million (source: builtwith.com[7])
Platform Number of sites Ping support
WordPress 32 yes
TypePad 16 yes
Moveable Type 20 yes
BlogSmith 14 n/a, proprietary
custom made 8 n/a
Drupal 4 yes
Blogger 3 yes
Expression Engine 1 n/a, proprietary
Scoop 1 no
Bricolage 1 no, CMS
Table4: Blogging platforms: 100 most popular blogs
(source: pingdom.com [39])
In Table 3, we show the four most popular blogging platforms for the Alexa’s top million websites in February
2012. These platforms account for more than 85% of all blogs, and they all support pings.
InTable4,weshowtheplatformthatthe100mostpopularblogchosetousein2009. Ofthese,atleast75
support pings.
IftheblogAlicehaschosendoesnotsupportblogpings,Alicecanperformthepingmanually,asmostping
servers offer this feature (e.g.,http://blogsearch.google.com/ping).
5.3 Estimating the Blocking Set
The Censor might attempt to block all blogs by blacklisting their domain names, or IP addresses. It is essential to
MIAB’s availability that the blocking set (that is, the set of domains or IP addresses to block) is large, as this makes
the maintenance of a blacklist impractical (this will be further discussed in Section 6.1). To estimate the size of the
blocking set, we generated three blacklists from three months of recorded pings. It can be seen that these blacklists
target Fully Qualiﬁed Domain Names (e.g., myblog.blogspot.com., see Figure 5), second-level domains
(e.g.,blogspot.com., see Figure 6), and IP addresses (see Figure 7).
Theseblacklistsarecumbersomeinsize. Forexample,accordingtoNetcraft,duringthetimeofourexperiment,
therewere662,959,946FQDNsrunningwebserversontheInternet[36]. Inourexperiment,wewouldhave
blacklisted 33,361,754 FQDNs, which is 5% of the ones found by Netcraft. Blocking second level domains
is also not practical. In our experiment, we blacklisted 1,803,345 of them, which account for 1.4% of the global
domainregistrations(whichare140,035,323,accordingtoDomainTools[14]). Notethatourblacklistsonly
cover blogs that sent pings during our experiment. The total numbers will be higher, as the trend shown in
27Figures5,6,and7suggests. Tobetterquantifythis,wecheckedthe(hypothetical)blacklists’scoverageonthe
pings that were emitted the day after we stopped updating the blacklists. We found that the blacklist targeting
FQNDs had 12% miss ratio, the one targeting second level domains had 11% miss ratio, and the one targeting IP
addresses had 11% miss ratio.
Even if the Censor chooses to pay the price of over-blocking and enforces these blacklists, Bob and Alice
can still communicate though MIAB, thanks to a weakness in this blacklisting approach. That is, a blog might
have multiple domain names (or IP addresses) assigned to it, but its pings are usually sent by only one of them.
So, Alice can edit her blog atblog.alice.com, a domain name that never sends pings and, therefore, is not
in the blacklist, and conﬁgure her blog to emit pings from the secondary address alice.blogspot.com.
Bob will receive the ping, and visit the latter address to obtain the MIABmessages. In turn, the Censor also sees
the ping, and will blacklist the secondary address in Alice’s country. Alice will be still able to modify her blog
throughblog.alice.com,sneakingbytheblacklist,andBobwillbeabletovisitalice.blogspot.com,
because the Censor’s block does not affect him.
6 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss MIAB’s resilience against the attacks that the Censor might mount to break the security
properties that MIABguarantees: availability, deniability, and conﬁdentiality.
Since we lack a formal veriﬁcation of the security of the steganographic primitives, and the powers of a real
Censor are unknown, these goals are necessarily best effort.
6.1 Availability
TheCensormightpreventAlicefromsendingmessagesthrough MIAB. Ourmainargumentagainstthisisthatthe
Censorwillbeforcedtobanalargepartoftheweb,andheislikelyunwillingtodosobecauseofthepushback
fromitspopulationandeconomicdrawbacks. WewillnowdescribeinmoredetailtheattacksthattheCensor
might devise to limit availability. For this discussion, we assume that deniability holds: In particular, the Censor
cannot detect content generated with MIAB.
TheCensorcouldblockbloggingplatforms. Infact,thishasalreadybeenattempted: Kazakhstanhasbeen
banning blogging platforms and social networks since 2008 [32]. In 2011, a court established they contributed to
the spread of religious terrorism [24]. Despite the block, Kazakh bloggers have moved to self-hosted or less
popular blogging platforms, and continue to grow in numbers [32]. There are over 165 million blogs on the
Internet [5], and a good part of them are self-hosted, making the maintenance of a blacklist impractical (see
Section 5.3). Even if the Censor is able to ﬁngerprint blogs and successfully block each of them, there are other
services that generate blog pings, for example, commenting services (e.g., Disqus, which is installed on 750,000
websites). Also, for her MIABmessaging, Alice might open a blog in favor of the ruling party: The Censor will be
less likely to block that, because it shows that the population is supporting the regime. The Censor might also
usepingstoidentifyblogs,blockinganydomainthatemitsaping. Thisapproach,whichwealreadydiscussed
inSection5.3,isalsovulnerabletoadenialofserviceattack: Bobcouldforgeboguspingsclaimingtobeany
arbitrarydomain(blogpings, justlikeemails,donotauthenticatethesender), forcingtheCensortoaddittothe
blacklist. Iteratingthisattack, Bobcandefactorendertheblacklistuseless. Tocounterthis,theCensorwillhave
to maintain a whitelist of allowed domains. This is harmful to the regime, because of the social and economic costs
of over-blocking, and can be easily circumvented (as we discussed in Section 5.3).
The Censor might want to block pings, or shut down ping servers. This attack is irrelevant when the blog
(or ping server) is hosted outside the Censor’s jurisdiction.
The Censor might try to prevent Alice to post on any blog. This requires both the ability to ﬁngerprint a blog,
and the technological power to deeply inspect the network trafﬁc to detect and block posting. The cost of this
attack increases as Alice will most likely be using a TLS connection (i.e.,https://) to make the post, requiring
the Censor to either man-in-the-middle the connection or perform statistical timing attacks. Also, Alice can create
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that). The Censor therefore has to block all these vectors.
The Censor might try to coerce content hosts to drop MIABcontent. However, to do so, he needs to identify
such content (when deniability should prevent him from doing so). Also, the Censor has to drop the content fast:
Bob will fetch the blog after just a few minutes, since blog pings are sent in real time.
The Censor might try to overwhelm MIABby creating large quantities of bogus messages. Bob should be
able to provide a fair service to its users by rate limiting blogs, and ban them when they exhibit abusive behavior.
SinceBobwillﬁrstinspectthelistofpings,hewillavoidfetchingblogsthatareovertheirquotaorblacklisted.
Also, search engines will fetch the same blog pings and will analyze and index their content. Since the Censor, to
create a large number of blog posts, will have to either generate the content automatically or replay content, search
engines should detect his behavior and mark it as spam. Blog ping spam (or sping) is already a problem that search
engines are facing, since pings are used in Search Engine Optimization campaigns. Because of this, much research
has been invested into detecting this type of behavior. Bob could leverage that research by querying the search
engine for the reputation of blog or blog posts. Using a combination of blacklists, rate limitation, and search
engines reputation systems, Bob is likely to thwart this attack.
TheCensormightperformtrafﬁcanalysistodistinguishregularblogpostsfrom MIABones. However, since
the blog post is created by a human, this is unlikely to be successful.
TheCensormightdecidetostripmetadatafromthedigitalpicturesuploadedtoblogs,orre-encodetheimages
toremoveanysteganographiccontent. First,thisiscomputationallyexpensivefortheCensor. Moreover, MIAB
can easily evolve and hide the ciphertext in other parts of the post (e.g., in the text), or use a steganographic system
that can withstand re-encoding [28].
6.2 Deniability
The Censor might try to identify who is using MIAB, thus compromising deniability.
The Censor might try to detect steganography. MIABuses steganography as a primitive, so its deniability
relies on a good steganographic algorithm, and will beneﬁt from any advancement in steganography. We discussed
the use of public-key image steganography in Section 3.2. Moreover, Bob might support several steganographic
algorithms, and let Alice pick the one she feels safe to use. Her choice can be encoded anywhere in the post (e.g,
the ﬁst letter of the title).
The Censor might try to detect anomalies in digital photo metadata. This is not relevant if the public-key
image steganographicalgorithm chosen doesnot alterthem. Also, thecontent storedin the metadatais ciphertext:
Assumingthatthecipherissound,theattackercannotdistinguishciphertextfromarandompermutationoftheinput
(otherwise, the cipher would fail an indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack). This attack is irrelevant if
we choose appropriately the metadata tags where the ciphertext is hidden. Several tags are well-suited to carry
arbitrary data (e.g., Exif.Image.OriginalRawImageDigest Exif.Photo.ImageUniqueID).
Since a blog post can contain several photos (in Section 5.1, we have shown that it is quite common that a post
contains up to ﬁve photos), the size of the ciphertext is not a factor that forces us to use detectable tags. Also, in our
implementation, we chose not to use the EXIF’s MakerNote tag, which stores proprietary binary data. This
tag,however,usuallyaccountsforthemajorityofthesizeofthemetadata,andhasseveralvendor-speciﬁctags
where additional ciphertext could be stored. We decided against using it in our proof-of-concept implementation,
because we found enough bits of available entropy within the standard tags (see Table 2).
TheCensormighttrytodetectanomalousbloggingbehavior. SinceAlicemanuallypublishesthepost,it
will be difﬁcult to detect anomalous behavior in a single post (provided that the message that Alice composes
is innocuous). However, the Censor might detect an anomaly if the posting frequency is higher than the other blogs
hosted on the same platform. Alice can mitigate this risk by keeping under control her post rate. Also, Alice can
use a blogging platform that encourages frequent posts with photos (i.e., a photoblog, or a moblog - a mobile
blogging platform). Alice might also have multiple online personas, each of which posts on a different blog.
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limitation common to any system that relies on a public key to identify the receiving party. This is mitigated by
publishing Bob’s public key in a variety of formats on the Internet, so that the Censor cannot ﬁnd them and block
or alter them.
The Censor might try to perform a timing attack, correlating the effect of the action speciﬁed in the MIAB
message (in our implementation, the posting of a new tweet) with the publishing of a new post. We can mitigate
this by letting the MIABuser specify when he wants the aforementioned action to be taken, inserting random
delays and generating decoys (in our implementation, tweeting a message that was not received).
6.3 Conﬁdentiality
To break conﬁdentiality, the Censor must get access to the plaintext of the message that Alice sent. The message is
encrypted with a public key, of which only Bob knows the private counterpart. Assuming that the cryptographic
primitiveissecure,theCensorwillnotbeabletoreadthemessage. Also,theCensormightrunaninstanceof
MIABto trick Alice, as we discussed in the previous section.
7 Related Work
There has been an extensive and ongoing discussion on anonymous and censorship-resistant communication.
In this section, we review the main directions of research, highlighting how they measure against the goals that we
have set for MIAB.
7.1 Anonymization proxies
The most established way to achieve online anonymity is through proxies, possibly with encrypted trafﬁc [1,33].
In 2010, a report from Harvard’s Center for Internet & Society [38] shows that 7 of the 11 tools with at least
250,000 unique monthly users are simple web proxies.
Thesesystemsfocusonhidingtheuseridentitiesfromthewebsitestheyaresurﬁngto. Theydeliverahigh
performance but, in doing so, they do not satisfy any of the goals of MIAB: They can be easily be blocked, since
it is easy to discover the addresses of the proxies and block them (low availability). Also, even if the trafﬁc is
encrypted, the users cannot deny that they were using the system (no deniability), and it is possible to mount
ﬁngerprinting and timing attacks to peek into the users’ activity [6,30].
One of the ﬁrst systems that address deniability is Infranet [17]. Uncensored websites deploying Infranet
woulddiscreetlyoffercensoredcontentuponreceivingHTTPtrafﬁcwithsteganographiccontent. Availabilityis
stillanissue, sincetheCensormightdiscoverandblockthesewebsites, sothecollaborationofalargenumberof
uncensored websites becomes essential.
7.2 Mix networks
Mix networks (e.g., Tor [13], Mixminion [11]) focus on anonymity and unlinkability, offering a network of
machines through which users can establish a multi-hop encrypted tunnel. In some cases, depending on the
location of the proxies with respect to the Censor, it is possible to link sender and receiver [4,35]. These systems
do not typically provide deniability, although Tor tries to mask its trafﬁc as an SSL connection [48].
The availability of these systems depends on the difﬁculty to enumerate their entry points, and their resistance
toﬂooding[15]. Protectingtheentrynodeshasproventobeanarmsrace: Forexample,theoriginalimplementation
of Tor provided a publicly-accessible list of addresses. These entry points were blocked in China in 2009 [49]. In
response, Tor has implemented bridges [45], which is a variation on Feamster’s key-space hopping [18]. However,
these bridges have some limitations that can expose the address of a bridge operator when he is visiting websites
through Tor [34]. Also, distributing the bridges’ addresses without exposing them to the Censor is theoretically
impossible(sincetheCensorcouldplayAlice’srole,andTorcannotdistinguishonefromtheother). However,
itmight bepossible toincrease thecost ofdiscovering abridgeso muchthat theCensor ﬁndsit impracticalto
enumerate them. This problem remains very complex and, so far, none of the approaches attempted has succeeded:
30Proof of this is the fact that China has been blocking the vast majority of bridges since 2010, as the metrics
published by Tor show [50].
7.3 Anonymous publishing
Here, the focus is on publishing and browsing content anonymously. Freenet [9] and Publius [53] explore the use
of peer-to-peer networks for anonymous publishing. These systems deliver anonymity and unlinkability, but
do not provide deniability or availability, as the Censor can see where the user is connecting, and block him.
Another direction that is being explored is to make it difﬁcult for the Censor to remove content without
affecting legitimate content (Tangler [52]). This system suffers similar pitfalls as Freenet, although availability of
the documents is improved by thedocument entanglement.
7.4 Deniable messaging
Systems for deniable messaging can be split into two categories: The ones that require no trusted peer outside the
country (e.g., CoverFS [3], Collage [8]), and the ones that do (e.g., Telex [54]). CoverFS is a FUSE ﬁle system that
facilitates deniable ﬁle sharing amongst a group of people. The ﬁle system synchronization happens though
messages hidden in photos uploaded to a web media service (Flickr, in their implementation). As mentioned
by the authors, while CoverFS focuses on practicality, the trafﬁc patterns could be detected by a powerful Censor.
This would affect its availability and deniability.
Collage, which we already described in Section 4.2, improves CoverFS’ concept of using user-generated
contenthostedonmediaservicestoestablishcovertchannels. Collagehashigheravailability,asthesiteswhere
thehiddenmessagesareleftchangeovertime,anditprovidesaprotocoltosynchronizetheseupdates. Asthe
authors point out, Collage deniability and availability are challenged when the Censor performs statistical and
timing attacks on trafﬁc. Also, if the Censor records the trafﬁc, he can join Collage, download the ﬁles where
the messages are embedded, and ﬁnd out from his logs who uploaded them. To join the Collage network, a user
needs to have an up-to-date version of tasks database, which contains the rendez-vous points. Since its distribution
has to be timely, this is challenging (and can be solved with MIAB). Also, without regular updates, the tasks
database can go stale, which requires a new bootstrap.
In Collage, the tasks deﬁning the rendez-vous points are generated manually. Although every media-sharing
sitecanpotentiallybeusedwithCollage,generatingallthesetasksrequiressubstantialwork. MIAB,instead,can
use millions of domains out of the box without human intervention, which makes monitoring more difﬁcult.
A Censor might also join Collage and disseminate large quantities of bogus messages. Since the burden of
ﬁnding the right message is on Collage’s users, they would be forced into fetching many of the bogus messages,
thusexposingthemselvestostatisticalattacks. Thiscouldbemitigatedbyratelimitingthemessagefetching,but
this decision would result in unbounded delays between the posting of the message and its retrieval, challenging
the availability of the system. An effective solution for this denial-of-service is to generate a separate task list
for any pair of people that need to communicate with each other. This can be done using MIABas a primitive to
disseminatethesedatabasestotheparties, sothattheycanbootstrapaCollagesession. Oncethetwopartiesare
exchanging messages, they can arbitrate the Collage channel they want to employ, depending on the performance
that their communication requires.
Telex is a system that should be deployed by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that sympathize with the
dissidents. A user using the Telex system opens a TLS connection to an unblocked site (that does not participate
in the protocol), steganographically embedding a request in the TLS handshake. When the ISP discovers the
request,itdivertstheSSLconnectiontoablockedsite. WhileTelexdeniabilityissound,itcanbesubjecttoa
denial of service by the Censor. Also, the Censor can discover ISPs implement Telex by probing the paths to
variouspointsontheInternet, andpreventthetrafﬁcoriginatingfromthecountryfromgoingthroughthoseISPs.
Overall, Telex comes close to satisfying the goals that we set for MIAB. However, it requires the ISP collaboration,
which is hard to set up, as the authors mention. MIAB, on the other hand, requires minimal resources (a good
31Internet connection and a single machine should sufﬁce, when implemented efﬁciently), and hence, it can be
setup today, as we demonstrated by hosting our public implementation of this system.
A simpler solution to our problem is to use an webmail service running outside the censored country (e.g.,
Gmail) to send a message to an address where a anti-censorship service is listening. In fact, this is one of the
channels used to distribute Tor briges (by sending an email to bridges@torproject.org). Since the
Censor can downgrade the dissident’s connection to the webmail provider and view the trafﬁc, this method is
not deniable. Also, the Censor can block emails sent to that address, challenging availability.
8 Conclusions
We have introduced MIAB, a deniable protocol for censorship resistance that works with minimal requirements.
MIABcanbeusedasastandalonecommunicationsystem,ortobootstrapprotocolsthatachievehigherperformance,
at the cost of more demanding requirements. We have demonstrated MIABfeasibility with the implementation of a
proof-of-concept prototype, and released its code open-source. The deployment of a MIABinstance requires
minimal conﬁguration and resources, since it relies on well-established and popular technologies (blog pings
and blogging platforms). Also, we have shown that MIABis resilient to attacks to its availability, deniability and
conﬁdentiality. Although a powerful Censor might be able to disrupt MIAB, in doing so he will suffer a high cost,
effectively cutting the population of his jurisdiction out of a major part of the Internet.
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